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Abstract
In the last two decades the Internet has become more and more impor-
tant to our live and economy. Also the number of threats to the Internet
is rising. Actual security systems that are used to protect the infrastruc-
ture are insufficient. For this reason Internet Early Warning Systems have
gain a more and more important position in research. Such systems have
a lot of aspects that must be bear in mind. These are technical and or-
ganisational aspects. In this work we give an overview of such aspects to
define the term Internet Early Warning Systems in detail.
1 Introduction
In order to protect the critical infrastructure Internet, Internet Early Warning
Systems have gain a more and more important position in the research area.
The objective of these systems is the early detection of threats. Early means
before a threat can cause any damage or before the threat cause the maximum
damage. A second objective is Situation Awareness, these systems should gen-
erate a picture of the actual security situation which can serve as a help for
decisions. These systems follow a global utilization, which protect not only one
local network, but give an estimation of the whole situation with combination
of different information from different local networks and give advice on how to
prevent the threats.
To build an Internet Early Warning System many different aspects must be
considered. These are not only technical aspects but also organisational and
legal aspects. In the next paragraphs we try to identify such aspects and try to
take conclusions about the realisation of such systems.
2 Related Work
Some work is done on Internet Early Warning Systems. Systems developed are
introduced in [1], [3], [26] or [25]. The last two are based on honeypots. The first
one gather statistical data from network traffic. The second one collect data
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from different type of sensors, e.g. netflow. A system specialized in malware is
shown in [30]. This work introduce a method for end-to-end worm containment
by using a p2p network and automated filter generation. In [] a system for
distributing security updates on an Internet wide level has been introduced.
The authors use a overlay structure for this.
At lot of work was done that deals with single aspects of an Internet Early
Warning System. Especially for the analysis of early warning times, e.g. model-
ing of malware propagation: [4], [5] and [6]. A model based on cellular automates
theory is introduced in [7]. Publications that deal with the question of confining
the spread of malware are [6] and [8]. Another work deals with the question
how malware looks like in the future and what is the propagation speed [9].
Communication of botnets is analyzed in [10], [11], [12] and [13]. The pub-
lications [10] and [11] give a deeper insight into the efficiency and resiliency of
botnets.
Attacks on BGP are introduced in [14]. An analysis of the behavior of BGP
is carried out in [15] and [16]. Information to the propagation speed of packages
in the Internet can be taken from [17], [18] and [19].
In the fields of detection and reaction to attacks their exists a lot of work.
Most of this comes from the field of intrusion detection/prevention. A survey
of anomaly detection can be found in [34]. Methods for anomaly detection can
for example be found [31], [32] and [33]. Work on misuse detection is described
in [35], [36] and [37]. Correlation methods were described in [38], [39] and [40].
Work on reaction to attacks are found in [41], [42], [43] and [44]. The first
one introduce a cost-based model for Intrusion Response Systems. The second
introduce a taxonomy for such systems. The use of machine learning to counter
flooding attacks is described in [43]. A survey of methods to counter DoS and
(D)Dos is given in [44].
3 Objectives of an Internet Early Warning Sys-
tem
The goal of an Internet Early Warning System is to protect and uphold the
functionality of the Internet. This means to protect and uphold the systems
that are part of this infrastructure or build this infrastructure. For this two
aspects are relevant:
• The early detection of threats and the initiation of countermeasures.
• The improvement of the information infrastructure to deal with future
requirements.
Based on this, one can identify the objectives of an Internet Early Warn-
ing System as to build a situation awareness and generate countermeasures to
actual threats based in this situation awareness, so an early reaction is possi-
ble. A second objective is the collection and analysis of information, so that an
assessment of future developments will be possible.
4 Definition of Early Warning
A definition for early warning in the area of natural catastrophe is following:
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Early warning is the warning of a menacing natural phenomenon which
occurs so early that the potentially concerned persons have the possibility to
react so that personal injury can be avoided or reduced. ([24])
Basically this definition can also be transferred to the area of early warning
in the Internet. But normally there is no personal damage in terms of injuries
of the people.
The word “early” in early warning can have many different meanings. To
explain this in more detail, we define an attack as a sequence of preparative
actions vi to the attack and the attack actions aj itself (equation 1). The
preparative actions for the attack can be for example scanning or password
cracking.
A = 〈v1, v2, · · · , vn, a1, a2, · · · , am〉 (1)
Based on this definition we define the different types of early warning as
following:
Type 1: before the start of an attack Such a warning can only be gener-
ated in two cases. In one case, one or more preparative actions (vi) are
detected. Then a warning can be generated before the sequence of attack
actions begin. In the second case, an attack is detected at a hop between
origin of the attack and target of the attack. In this case there is a chance
to warn the target before the attack reaches the target. The attack can
be identified both in the preparative steps (vi) and the attack steps itself
(ai).
Type 2: with beginning of/during the attack The attack has already be-
gun, one or several steps ai were already executed, but the attack has not
finished yet, so the attack either doesn’t cause any damage until this point
or has not yet reached the maximal potential damage. The detection can
take place at the attacked system or a hop on the way.
Type 3: before a possible threat Under this category, situations are sum-
marized that can lead to a concrete problem but that must not be the
case. Here are two different situations. The first situation deals with
propagation phenomena. This can be e.g., the propagation of a malware
using an HTTP-server security gap. As long as the security gap in own
system is not patched and the local protection system such as Intrusion
Detection System (IDS) and virus scanners are not updated, there exists
the danger that own system can be a victim. But this must not be the
case if the malware never tries to infect the own system or doesn’t try until
an effective protection is installed. This is similar for SPAM or Phishing
attempts. There is potential threat, which doesn’t lead directly to an at-
tack and maybe it never come to an attack at all. However, the danger
exists basically. In this situation a warning is provided for threat that
need some time to spread globally. At the time of warning, a number of
potential victims can already be affected and the main goal of the warning
is to warn the rest of the not affected victims.
The second situation is about security gaps which are discovered, but are
not yet used by an attacker. These can be discovered for example by
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reviewing the code of a manufacturer. In this situation all affected ones
can be warned early theoretically.
5 Threat Scenarios
An important questions is what kind of thread scenarios must be considered
by an Internet Early Warning System? For this work different threat scenarios
were analysed. To decide what is a important scenario is relatively hard and
we need a definition of the critical infrastructure. A communication-technically
oriented definition would draw the line at the routers and wires, i.e. the infras-
tructure which is required for transport of network packages. The question is
here, however, whether such a definition is purposeful. It can be argued that
DNS is an important protection-worth component of the infrastructure, because
without DNS a reasonable use of the Internet is not possible. The same can
be stated for the email service or for HTTP, because these services are used by
a lot of people. So a threat is then relevant when it causes a great damage in
terms of cost to the infrastructure.
But based on this the decision if a threat scenario is relevant or not is not
easy. For this we give an example: A (D)DoS-attack that affects the global
Internet traffic by his strength can be stated as relevant. What is, however,
with a single exploit attempt which can lead, at the end, to a DoS on a target
system? The things become much more complicated now. It is absolutely not
relevant if only a simple workstation is crashed, but what when the system is
an important server, e.g. a DNS root server? At this moment this scenario
becomes relevant to the Internet Early Warning System. It is also relevant
when the same exploit is used on thousands of systems. At this moment you
can’t ignore the event because it can bring the Internet into a state where it
is not usable anymore. Based on these considerations following scenarios were
investigated: (D)DoS, exploits, malware spreading, botnets, Routing.
5.1 (D)DoS
First consider a DoS scenario. Assume an attacker performs an SYN-flood on a
target. This leads to a rise of the number of network packets with set TCP-SYN
flag on the routes to the target and at the target. When we use threshold based
attack detection, we will get an alarm after a threshold value is reached. This
means with a certain packet a threshold is exceeded. Let Ttotal be the overall
time for a packet on his way from source to destination. This time is the sum
of the transmission times between the hops ttrans and the processing times on
the hops tproc. See equation 2.
Ttotal =
N∑
i=1
(ttrans,i + tproc,i) (2)
The early warning time TEW is the difference between the overall time Ttotal
and the transmission time to the hop where the attack was detected (TD). See
equation 3. We assume here that the detections on the hop and on the target
of the attack are similar, so there is no difference caused by different detection
methods or parameters.
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TEW = Ttotal − TD =
N∑
i=1
(ttrans,i + tproc,i)−
D∑
i=1
(ttrans,i + tproc,i)
=
N∑
i=D+1
(ttrans,i + tproc,i)
(3)
The data from [19] shows the latency between different tier one providers.
From this the latency can be assumed to be less than 100 ms. From measure-
ments with a system called InternetVerfu¨gbarkeitsSystem ([2]) we know that
the round trip time to different servers in the Internet is also under 100 ms in
average. Based on these data we can expect only a few seconds as early warn-
ing time in the best case. As the warning is delivered over the same network
we can not expect to generate an early warning that reaches the victim in an
appropriate time. This means there is no advantage compared to detection at
the victim. In principle the same can be applied to (D)DoS-Attacks.
5.2 Exploits
Exploits use security gaps in software to crash a system (DoS) or to get the
access to the system. For example this can be done by provoking a buffer
overflow. Such exploits are used by malware to spread over the Internet, so that
they are relevant for Internet Early Warning Systems. There are two different
approaches to analyze this scenario:
• To protect from an concrete attack (early warning of type 1 or 2)
• General determination of the threat level of exploits (early warning of type
3)
The first approach is similar to the (D)DoS scenario. The exploit consists
of one or more network packages that will be exchanged between attacker and
victim. A hop on the way can detect the exploit with help of a signature and
can send a warning to the destination. If we assume a one packet exploit we
will get the same early warning time which is shown in equation 3 section 5.1.
Because of the fast transmission of packets in the Internet (see section 5.1),
there is no significant speed up in reaction time compared to a local security
system. This means there is no advantage in using an Internet Early Warning
System. An early warning of type 1 is not possible.
The second approach is to warn not from a concrete attack, but from a
potential threat. In this case the Internet Early Warning System determines
information which exploits are currently used and try to identify new exploits
which are unknown so far (Zero-Day-exploits). Such information can be e.g
gathered by honeypots. Based on these information warnings can be given and
be used to create countermeasures. Because of the fact that not all vulnerable
systems will be attacked at the same time we are able to give an early warning
(type 3) and to generate an effective protection against the exploit. An example
is the spreading of a malware. The time we have for early warning strongly
depends on the kind of threat. It can be minutes up to hours. Whether an early
warning is really possible depends on the situation.
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5.3 Malware Spreading
There are many publications to the modeling of the propagation of autonomous
spreading malware, examples are [4], [5] and [6]. Most of them use an epidemic
propagation model which is also used for the modeling of spreading of biological
viruses. These models are called SIR-Models. He spreading is than described
by an exponential spreading curve.
By an infection the question is how many time is still there for the reaction
before it has only a minor effect, i.e. since when should a reaction begin so
that it is still effective and since when the reaction is just a limitation to the
damage. In [6] and [8] this aspect is investigated. The results there show that
a reaction has to begin very early during the spreading process. The earlier the
countermeasures are seized, the less the malware spread.
This results show that the reaction should begin before the outbreak reaches
the exponential part of the curve. If this happens there is no chance to have a
significant impact on the spreading. The possible early warning time depends
basically on the worm. After [21] code red has reached his biggest spread within
14 hours. An reaction within the first 5 hours would make sense . Another
example is the Witty worm. This has infected all potential hosts within 45
minutes. The worm SQL-Slammer was even quicker and needs only 15 minutes
to infect all potential hosts ([22]). In [9] it is analyzed how fast a worm can
theoretically spread. The article comes to the result that propagation is possible
within 15 minutes even if with bigger potential populations. This means we
have only a very short time span for reaction. In the best case there are several
hours available. However, at least a warning can be provided in both case which
corresponds to an early warning of type 3.
5.4 Botnets
Botnets are one of the biggest threats in the Internet. Using it, the potential
victims can be scanned, an attack can started, SPAM can be sent and other
harmful activities can be done. By the mass of the computers on such networks
(several Thousand to Hundred Thousand or even Millions) the threat potential
is very high.
In the past botnets owned a central aligned structure with one or several
Command and Control servers (C & C) that control the botnet. These had a
very simple structure but were very vulnerable to attacks against their C & C
servers. Switching off the C & C server, switches off the botnet. Meanwhile
the number of botnets that are organized decentralized is increasing. These are
based on P2P technologies. An example of such a botnet is the StormWorm
botnet [13]. These are not so easy to switch off because it is not enough to switch
of a few nodes. An analysis of this aspect for decentralized botnets is given in
[10] or [11]. The result shows that it is very hart to switch off a decentralized
botnet. One of the best methods is to stop it during the creation phase but this
is also very difficult. However, this alone is not enough, more effort must be
done to detect and disinfect the infected systems.
Instead of switching off the botnets, man can also try to sniff their commu-
nication to get information of the threats which go out currently from them.
Based on this information warnings could be generated and countermeasures be
developed.
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How fast botnets commands can be distributed inside botnet, this specifies
the reaction time for countermeasures. In [10] this question is investigated for
different botnet structures. The authors come to the result that propagation
within a few minutes is possible, e.g. 6 minutes for a botnet with million nodes
and 1 MB commands. With more worse assumptions the authors ([11]) think
a time of approximately an hour is realistic. This is the time to reach every
zombie in the botnet. But this is not necessary for the successful realization,
e.g. (D)DoS attack. For this kind of attack, potentially fewer hosts are needed
than the number of hosts in the botnet, which means the time for early warning
becomes shorter.
Again in this scenario an effective early warning of the type 1 is difficult.
However, with slow communicating botnets, it is possible.
5.5 Routing
The routing infrastructure builds the basis for a well working Internet. Core of
this infrastructure is the BGP protocol. There are a series of attacks to this
protocol. [14] gives an overview for it. A part of these attacks are targeted at a
single router and the goal is to switch off this router by exploits. This has only
limited influence on the whole routing infrastructure. More interesting are the
attacks that try to redirect data by influencing the routing data.
Let’s assume that an attacker give wrong routing information to a router.
An analysis how long a route announcement need to spread in the routing in-
frastructure is introduced as a part of [15] and [16]. Based on it, a convergence
time of few minutes can be assumed. In more than 90 % of the cases a con-
vergence is reached after approximately 2 minutes. A deletion of a route needs
longer, approximately 180 seconds.
A concrete example of such a scenario is the incident from the 24.02.2008
which is described in [20]. Pakistani Telekom has a new Prefix announced for ip
addresses that belong to YouTube. Within a few minutes (approx. 2 minutes)
this prefix had been distributed in a big part of the routing system and the
requests to YouTube have been directed to Pakistani Telekom. This problem
could be solved by a suitable reaction.
The early warning time is in this scenario also very short. By the quick prop-
agation of routing information only few minutes left for the reaction. Therefore
a direct warning before the threat and also the reaction is very difficult.
5.6 Summary
From the analysis above we cans see that an distributed sensor system have
only limited use in countering an concrete attack (early warning of type 1 or
2). We can get some useful information from it but for early warning of this
types the period of time from detection to hitting the target of the attack is to
short. So the main objective of an Internet Early Warning System should be to
detect new threats, so it can generate early warnings of type 3. This does not
mean that no components needed to detect concrete attacks, it only means that
such components are not very helpful located somewhere outside the target of
an attack.
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Figure 1: Building blocks of an Internet Early Warning System.
6 Definition of the Term Internet Early Warn-
ing System
Abstract an Internet Early Warning System can be defined as a six tuple of the
form:
F = (N,P,O,L,G,C)
N := Network, that would be monitored.
P := Organisations, that are part of the early warning system.
O := Definition of the organisational structures and pro-cesses necessary to run a early warning system.
L := Legal framework, necessary for the operation of anInternet Early Warning System.
G := Objectives, that should be achieved by an InternetEarly Warning System.
C := Technical components of an Internet Early WarningSystem.
(4)
Figure 1 shows this components and their relations. They will be described
in more detail in the next paragraphs.
6.1 Network (N)
This element describes the monitored network. In case of an Internet Early
Warning System the Internet. The knowledge of the underlying network is used
to place the sensors and helps to estimate the propagation of faults. But its not
8
only important for technical aspects it have also influence on the organisational,
legal and architectural aspects of an Internet Early Warning System.
The Internet is composed by autonomous systems that are managed by dif-
ferent organisations. This is important because that means there is no global
control over the Internet. The building blocks of the Internet are managed
locally and underlie different legal frameworks. This shows that a centralized
approach for an Internet Early Warning System for the whole Internet is not
suitable. Most of the decisions are better made at the local organisation based
on the environmental conditions.
6.2 Organisations (P)
The component P is the set of organisations / people involved in the early
warning system. Involved stand here for actively involved or passively involved.
Active partners are involved in the construction and operation of the Inter-
net Early Warning System, e.g. as operator of sensors or by the initiation of
countermeasures.
The group of the active partners must suitably chosen. An unfavorable
composition of this group reduces the effectiveness of the early warning system.
It is important to get all the information needed for early warning.
Under the term passive partners fall everybody which do not help actively
in the operation of the Internet Early Warning System, but profiting from the
information which the Internet Early Warning System generates. These can
be different institutions or people. Examples are manufacturers of anti-virus
software who can provide new signatures for worms or administrators which
can improve the security of their networks. It is important to find suitable
communication channels. They must be fast and resilient enough.
6.3 Organisation (O)
The component O describes the organisation of an Internet Early Warning Sys-
tem. The organisation can be divided in the organisational structure and the
operational structure. The organisational structure defines the organizational
units of the Internet Early Warning System and their relations to each other.
The operational structure defines the processes that are necessary for the oper-
ation of an Internet Early Warning System, e.g., the kind of information must
be defined that are sent to the situation center or it must be defined how to
react to different threat situations. Important for the organisation are:
• Short decision making process
• Efficient information distribution
• Clearly defined responsibilities
By this requirement a strictly hierarchically built up organisation with many
levels are not well suited. Rather it is necessary that the organisations communi-
cate directly with each other. In some cases it might be necessary to coordinate
the reaction on a global level. This can be necessary in case of an (D)DoS that
affects a big part of the infrastructure. But most of the time its more important
to distribute information as quickly as possible and trigger a local reaction. This
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has different reasons as, e.g. different policies for handling incidents, different
system architectures or different laws.
6.4 Legal framework (L)
This aspect deals with the question to what extent the existing laws support
the operation of an early warning system. Different aspects of law are touched,
e.g. data protection or contract law.
7 Technical Components (C)
From a technical point of view an Internet Early Warning System consists of
a bunch of components. These components are Sensors, Detection, Knowledge
Base, Incident Management and Reaction, Perpetuation of evidence, Informa-
tion distribution.
7.1 Sensors
The sensors of an Internet Early Warning System are needed to:
• To generate an overview of the actual situation, this means to generate a
situation awareness.
• To identify new threats, e.g. new malware spreading over the Internet.
• To identify concrete attacks actual running.
The sensors needed for an Internet Early Warning Systems are of different
types. Most important are sensors that identify new threats. Most important
an Internet Early Warning System need to use honeypots and honeyclients to
identify malware and new exploits. As the analysis above shows it can also
be helpful to monitor botnet traffic. This can be a chance to react before a
attack starts. For this one method is to be part of a botnet by using modified
bot code. Also sensors that monitor the routing and naming infrastructure are
needed. But it must be stated that a reaction is difficult because of the short
time spans. A Internet Early Warning System should also generate information
on SPAM and Phishing. This can be done automated or by the input of Internet
users (swarm intelligence).
The detection of concrete attacks on a network intrusion detection systems
like snort can be used. For detection of (D)DoS attacks it needs to use sensors
that give information about the amount of traffic in the Internet. This can be
a system like the one described in [1] or other systems.
7.2 Detection Component
Core of an early warning system is the detection of threats. In general this
component can be divided in two layers, the signal layer and the event layer.
This is shown in figure 2.
On the signal layer data from network or log data is analysed by anomaly
and misuse detection methods and generates events. For this a knowledge base
is used which includes models for normal behavior or signatures for threats.
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Figure 2: Detection component.
This layer only use technical information sources that monitor the network
infrastructure. The knowledge base must be updated on a regular basis to
capture changes in network behaviour and new threats. Methods for detection
for example introduced in [31], [32] and [33].
On the event layer tries to correlate the events from the signal level and
information from external sources like CERTs or other security systems, e.g.
Intrusion Detection Systems. The information from external sources may be
also events but can also be other information like the information that a new
exploit is used by malware. Methods for event correlation are for example
introduced in [38], [39] and [40].
Another task of this component is the prediction of incidents. This means
based on events detected by the signal layer the most probable incident should
be predicted and which kind of events will happen next.
7.3 Knowledge Base
The knowledge base include knowledge to different aspects of an Internet Early
Warning System. In detail this includes knowledge of normal behaviour and sig-
natures for threats, knowledge about incidents, knowledge about countermea-
sures to incidents, knowledge about environmental conditions (technical aspects,
organisation aspects, legal aspects, ...).
The knowledge must be updated on a regular basis because of new threats,
changes in network infrastructure and behaviour, improvement of countermea-
sures and changes in the environmental conditions.
7.4 Incident Management and Reaction
This is a kind of an expert system that support the users by the processing of
incidents. It is connected to the knowledge base and supports the user in its
decision process by suggesting steps for further analysis to decide what kind
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of incident the actual situation is and what kind of countermeasures should be
used.
In the best cases countermeasures should be initiated automatically based on
information collected locally and information from the outside, because of the
short early warning times. The countermeasure component must generate the
best countermeasure based on the incident information and the environmental
conditions. The problem is to decide what is the best countermeasure. A
metric must be defined that helps to decide this question. In some cases it can
be the best decision to do nothing and wait until a better countermeasure can
be used. This is the case when the countermeasure produces a higher cost than
the damage caused by the threat would do. Because it is very hard to decide
what countermeasure to use, a human interaction is required to authorize the
chosen countermeasure.
In some cases it may be necessary to initiate coordinated countermeasures.
This means countermeasures that are initiated not by one but by many users
of the Internet Early Warning System. This can be useful for example in cases
of (D)DoS.
7.5 Perpetuation of Evidence
In the case of the recognition of an attack this component is used for the perpet-
uation of evidence which can be used in the criminal proceedings. The objective
is to collect data that allows to take evidence that an attack happened and who
has started the attack.
The access to these data must be limited and may occur only in reasonable
cases. The application of cryptographic procedures is necessary here. These
protect the data against unauthorized access. In the easiest case the data can
be the complete recording of the network traffic or data from log files.
7.6 Information Distribution
This component is needed to distribute information to the users of the In-
ternet Early Warning System. The information can be of different kind, e.g.
warnings/alerts, countermeasures, description about threats, information about
SPAM and Phishing sites.
The distribution system must be fast and resilient. An import end ques-
tion is how to deal with the injection of wrong information. This leads to the
assumption that information distributed in the system must be verified.
8 Architecture of an Internet Early Warning Sys-
tem
A big question is how to combine the different components in one system. Based
on the analysis of threats and conditions above we propose a distributed archi-
tecture. The reasons for this are:
• Different policies at the local system for incident handling and initiation
of countermeasures
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Figure 3: General structure of an Internet Early Warning System.
• Different environmental conditions, so that not every countermeasure can
applied to every network
• Fast distribution of threats
• In future more use of cryptography, so that deep packet inspection is only
usable at the target systems of the traffic
• Different legal conditions at different countries
Core of the system are strong local security systems that are connected by an
efficient information sharing network. Over this network the local system share
information about threats and countermeasures. An situation center is part of
this network and can generate statistical information and help in coordinating
countermeasures. This structure is shown in figure 3.
For the information sharing network we propose the use of a p2p network.
This is because we need a fast and resilient possibility to share information. P2P
networks have been shown to fulfill this requirements. An example is the analysis
in [10], that show how efficient and resilient different botnet structures are.
Another example is shown in [30] that uses a p2p network for worm containment.
The local security components consists of the other components mentioned
in section 7. At the local system the different kind of sensors will be operated.
The information of this sensors will be analysed by the detection component to
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Figure 4: Architecture of the local Internet Early Warning System components.
detect attacks on the local system and new threats that can be interesting for
other users of the Internet Early Warning System. For this not only the infor-
mation of the local sensors are used but also the information distributed by the
information sharing network and the information of the knowledge base com-
ponent. The Incident management and reaction component than try to initiate
countermeasures and can decide to give information to other partners of the
Internet Early Warning System. In the best case this works automatic but we
believe that a human interaction is necessary. For this to work a connection to
the information sharing network is needed that can receive and verify messages
from the network and send messages over the network. In the local security sys-
tem also the component for perpetuation of evidence is located. This structure
is shown in figure 4.
9 Conclusion
In this work we have defined the term Internet Early Warning System and
analyzed what kind of early warning is possible. We concluded that an early
warning of type 1 is not possible. The network packages are sent too fast through
the network, so that there is no significant speed up compared to the warning
directly generated by a local security system. In principle, this argument is also
valid for identify the attack at the preparative steps.
It seems more reasonable to use the early warning type 3. This means
the detection of threats that propagate through the Internet, such as malware,
SPAM or something similar. A certain time span is available for early warning
because of the propagation character of the threats. The above analysis shows
that only a few scenarios are of this kind but it shows also that even in this
cases the early warning time is sometimes very short, see section 5.5 or 5.4.
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This leads to the second conclusion. Most of the detection and countermea-
sures to attacks must be initiated at the local systems that are target of the
attacks. This is not only because of the short period of tome for reaction but
also because of the different law situations depending on the location of the
targeted system and different policies in administration of the systems. The
Internet Early Warning System can only give helpful information to generate
such countermeasures. As we see from the analysis an Internet Early Warning
System in most cases can provide additional information, which can be used to
analyze the actual situation and can also help to make decisions on counter-
measures. Therefore another important character of an Internet Early Warning
System is the aspect of situation awareness. This can help to judge the actual
situation and make decisions.
From this we can conclude that a key component of an Internet Early Warn-
ing System is an efficient information sharing network. This network must be
able to distribute information very fast to a high number of clients. It also
must be resilient in case of attacks or damages to components of this network.
A good structure to achieve this goals can be a p2p structure as it is used in
actual botnets or for example in [30] for worm containment.
Another key component must be installed at the client that get information
from the local network. This is a strong local security component that does
the work at the local systems. This component must be able to generate coun-
termeasures automatically based on the data from the Internet Early Warning
System and on the environmental conditions.
This implies that a Internet Early Warning Systems is in a big part an
information sharing network and only the local components are like intrusion
detection system. It only distribute information as fast as possible to help the
clients to protect their systems. The reaction must than be generated at the
local systems. This leads to another observation. A situation center is only a
client of this network that collects the data to give an overview what actual
happens and helps in the analysis and reaction. In some cases a situation center
can try to coordinate countermeasures, e.g. in case of massive (D)DoS attacks
but in most cases it collects statistics and give hints about countermeasures back
into a network. It does not have special position in such a network compared
to the other clients.
For this kind of Internet Early Warning System further research is necessary.
One must answer the question what kind of sensors and how many of them are
needed. What kind of network structure is best used for information sharing,
how many clients such a network has to service, what kind of information should
distributed and how we can secure such a network. Also there must be some
kind of normalization on the information shared.
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